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The usual disclaimer applies. 1 Introduction
The equity premium puzzle is the empirical observation due to Mehra and
Prescott (1985) that the coecient of relative risk aversion estimated from the
macro consumption based CAPM with power utility is excessively high on US
data. This observation has fascinated many in the economics profession over the
past two decades. Progress has been made towards understanding the puzzle
by looking into the consequences of limited participation in the stock market
(Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991; Attanasio et al., 2002; Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002),
habit formation of investors (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999) and decoupling
risk aversion from the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (Epstein and Zin,
1989). But the nal verdict is not out.
The point of this paper is not to come up with yet another theoretical
explanation for the high coecient of relative risk aversion. Rather, we ask to
which extent the equity premium puzzle is a statistical phenomenon due to lack
of macro data reliability. In his authoritative review Campbell (1998) already
showed that the estimates vary widely across a number of countries, but gave no
statistical analysis of this uncertainty. We replicate Campbell's results, extend
his data set and use the jackknife resampling method to gauge the uncertainty.
Furthermore, we show that by pooling the country data one obtains a much
tighter condence band on the world coecient of relative risk aversion than
an analysis based on an individual country.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section the
model is outlined. Our methodology is introduced in the third section. Next,
the data used in our empirical investigation are described. Section 5 discusses
the results and the nal section concludes.
2 Model
In the canonical framework where a representative investor has a time-separable
power utility function over aggregate consumption, the Euler equation reads
1 = Et[Ri;t+1Mt+1]: (1)
Here Ri is the gross return on some asset i and M denotes the stochastic
discount factor. The discount factor is Mt+1 = (Ct+1=Ct) , where  is the
subjective rate of time preference, C is aggregate consumption and  is the
coecient of relative risk aversion. Supose that asset returns and aggregate
consumption are conditionally lognormally distributed with constant variance.
Take logs of equation (1) and rewrite to get
Etri;t+1 =  log  + Etct+1  
2
i + (c)2   2ic
2
:
The small case letters denote logarithms; 2
i and 2
c are, respectively, the un-
conditional variance of the log return innovations and consumption innovations
and ic is their unconditional covariance. For a riskless asset, return innova-
1tions and the covariance with consumption are both zero, implying that the log
risk premium for asset i can be conveniently expressed as





In words, equation (2) says that the expected excess returns of equity are
equal to the amount of risk aversion times the correlation between consumption
growth and excess returns minus a correction factor (i.e. a Jensen inequality
term arising as we are using expectations of log returns). The expression permits
a calibration of the risk aversion parameter  from estimates of the moments
in equation (2). In most cases US data on these moments are used. As the
US has historically been blessed with high equity returns and rather smooth
consumption growth, typical  estimates are high.
Using moment estimates given in equation (2) to back out the parameter of
relative risk aversion gives a point estimate, but not a condence interval. For
this reason condence bands are mostly not reported1. Given that estimates in
the literature vary quite dramatically it is of interest to provide for a condence
interval. The next section uses the jackknife resampling scheme to provide
condence intervals.
3 Methodology
We use the block-jackknife procedure, see e.g. Shao and Tu (1995), as it is easy
to implement and because it can deal with the serial correlation that is present
in the consumption series. Let n be the size of the sample, let m denote the
number of omitted observations in a resample and let N denote the number
of resamples. Note that the total number of resamples is N = n   m + 1.
To estimate the variance of ^ n, the estimate of  based on all observations,
one rst deletes m subsequent observations at a time and denotes the new
estimate of  by ^ (i). Then the i-th pseudovalue of ^ n, denoted by ~ i, is dened
as

n^ n   (n   m)^ (i)
=m. The resulting vector of pseudovalues across the
















These estimates can then be used to form a country-specic condence
interval (CI) for ^ n. More specically, the Quenouille-Tukey mean of the pseu-
dovalues, see Shao and Tu (1995, p. 6), is the bias-corrected version of the
estimate of n and the required critical value is taken from a t-distribution,
with N   1 degrees of freedom (Miller, 1974).
Our second contribution is to use the cross-sectional dimension of our data
set to get a CI for the pooled estimator, to which we refer as the world coecient
1Cecchetti et al. (1993) use GMM to construct standard errors of estimated parameters.
Their results are dicult to compare with our outcomes, since they employ a Markov switching
model.
2of relative risk aversion (w). It is highly likely that the information contained in
the estimates of n diers between countries, so some kind of weighted average
seems to be a natural choice. As the block-jackknife procedure gives us the
country-specic sample variances, we can use the optimal weights from Graybill








where k denotes the number of countries. Condence intervals are then formed
by weighting the country-specic averages of the pseudovalues to get ^ w. It is








The critical values are based on a t-distribution with k   1 degrees of freedom.
Besides the optimal weighting scheme, we also employ two economic based
weighting schemes. For these we use GDP and stock market capitalization.






where wj is now dened as the GDP (market capitalization) of country j divided
by the sum of GDP (market capitalization) of all countries.
4 Data
The methodology described in the previous section is applied to data for OECD
countries. Of the 30 countries, 9 had to be dropped for the following reasons.
Iceland, Luxembourg and the Slovak Republic are excluded since we do not
have three-month interest rates for these countries. Too few observations has
led to the exclusion of Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Mexico, Portugal and Turkey.
For all 21 remaining countries, data are taken from three dierent sources.
First, private nal consumption expenditure (Quarterly National Accounts, in
constant prices)2 and CPI (Main Economic Indicators, all items) are from the
OECD. Second, equity returns (in local currency units) are from MSCI. Finally,
the risk-free rate and population gures are from the International Financial
Statistics provided by the IMF. The sample period is country-specic, as can
be seen in Table 1. Thus the panel is unbalanced.
For the economic based weighting schemes we need two additional variables.
The rst is GDP (Annual National Accounts, in US dollars, current prices,
current exchange rates; OECD) and the second is market capitalization in US
dollars (World Federation of Exchanges).
2Note that this implies that our results are independent of the measure of ination.
35 Results
Estimates of n based on equation (2) are shown in Table 1. The number of
omitted observations in each block, m, is set to 4 so that we leave out one year
of observations at a time. Four of the 21 coecients of relative risk aversion
are negative, implying that agents are risk loving. The remaining estimates
are positive and rather high, with the exception of Korea and Poland. Yet the
results are in line with those reported by Campbell (1998). In the Appendix we
replicated the results of Campbell, but add our estimates for the pseudovalues
and the condence bands3.
The averages of the pseudovalues, i.e.
PN
i=1 ~ i, are reported in the next
column. Note that these dier considerably from the overall estimates ^ n. Given
the small value of m, this is indicative for the uncertainty in the estimates of
. More than half of these values are negative, perhaps implying that most
estimates are severely biased. These average pseudovalues are the basis of the
symmetric 95% condence interval. From this, it is evident that there is a lot
of uncertainty in the estimate of the coecient of relative risk aversion. Only
the condence band for Korea is rather tight, the others are fairly wide. The
averages of the pseudovalues may look uke, but if one considers the CI, or
realizes that the CI for Campbell (1998) also comprise a very wide range, the
point estimates of Table 1 look more in line with the generally smaller point
estimates from the Campbell subset (see Appendix).
The condence intervals also show that the null hypothesis of a coecient
of relative risk aversion between one and ten, a range most economists (see, e.g.
Mehra and Prescott (1985)) consider to be a reasonable guess, is never rejected
on the basis of the individual country jackknifed condence bands.
Some preliminary results from pooling can already be deducted from Table
1. In particular, consider the means and standard errors of the third and fourth
columns. The mean of ^ n is 97, with a standard error of 50; implying that a
condence interval based on these numbers would be rather wide. When using
the bias-corrected estimates, the results are even worse. With a mean of -517
and a standard error of 338, the resulting condence interval would be even
wider. However, note that these results are obtained under equal weighting.
Hence the estimate of Switzerland would have a weight equal to that of Korea,
although the latter is estimated much more precisely. Now we turn to some
results in which some alternative weighting schemes are used.
Table 2 presents the results based on pooling of country-specic data, which
gives an estimate of the world risk aversion parameter. The top panel presents
the outcomes obtained while using the optimal variance weights. The optimally
weighted mean of the pseudovalues is just over 4.5 (hence within this plausible
range) and the 95% CI is rather tight. Note that it is less wide than its coun-
terpart for the US, hence pooling of information is clearly benecial. Moreover,
the resultant CI contains the often hypothesized reasonable values of below 10.
Again equality to one is not rejected for the world risk aversion parameter.
3Note that all estimates of n are identical, except the one for the US. The reason is that
the riskfree rate we employ diers slightly from the one used by Campbell.
4Table 1: Country-specic results
Notes: The estimate of the coecient of relative risk aversion is denoted by
^ n, PS is the mean of the pseudovalues, dened in Section 3. The condence
interval is based on PS, with standard error equal to the square root of the
variance estimated by equation (3) and critical value from a t-distribution with
N   1 degrees of freedom. Mnemonics are as follows: Australia (AU), Austria
(OE), Belgium (BG), Canada (CN), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK),
Finland (FN), France (FR), Germany (BD), Italy (IT), Japan (JP), Korea
(KO), the Netherlands (NL), New Zealand (NZ), Norway (NW), Poland (PO),
Spain (ES), Sweden (SD), Switzerland (SW), the United Kingdom (UK) and
the United States (US).
Country Sample period ^ n PS 95% CI
AU 1970Q1 - 2003Q3 128.137 -649.743 -6436.591 5137.106
OE 1988Q2 - 2003Q3 91.785 105.830 -164.519 376.178
BG 1995Q2 - 2003Q3 194.012 -890.138 -3253.383 1473.107
CN 1970Q1 - 2003Q3 45.283 31.026 -63.631 125.683
CZ 1996Q2 - 2003Q3 -192.062 -1186.110 -2549.966 177.745
DK 1990Q2 - 2003Q3 97.100 -1148.469 -3548.994 1252.056
FN 1990Q2 - 2003Q3 205.859 -0.029 -824.942 824.884
FR 1978Q2 - 2003Q3 165.192 126.980 -99.475 353.436
BD 1975Q4 - 2003Q3 165.699 408.698 -1242.742 2060.138
IT 1981Q2 - 2003Q3 109.933 57.053 -831.561 945.666
JP 1994Q2 - 2003Q3 -36.888 -140.967 -576.125 294.190
KO 1988Q1 - 2003Q3 4.370 -4.678 -43.445 34.090
NL 1988Q2 - 2003Q3 230.626 -141.995 -1208.822 924.832
NZ 1988Q1 - 2003Q3 -108.278 -6922.594 -28175.744 14330.556
NW 1978Q2 - 2003Q3 -395.137 578.187 -5001.918 6158.293
PO 1995Q2 - 2003Q3 4.880 -22.444 -117.167 72.280
ES 1995Q2 - 2003Q3 155.836 98.382 -182.405 379.168
SD 1993Q2 - 2003Q3 178.290 -240.757 -1160.223 678.709
SW 1980Q2 - 2003Q3 852.612 -987.567 -55476.582 53501.449
UK 1970Q1 - 2003Q3 69.220 24.059 -139.946 188.063
US 1970Q1 - 2003Q3 67.561 47.147 -74.843 169.137
The other two rows hold the results after, respectively, disregarding Korea and
Switzerland. The reason for Korea is that its variance of  is estimated much
more precisely than any other country. As a result its weight is much larger.
In contrast, the estimated variance of Switzerland is the highest. As shown in
the top panel of Table 2, although Korea has a rather large weight, our results
are quite robust to its inclusion. The point estimate is now outside the a priori
plausible range, but the condence interval is still tight. As expected, excluding
Switzerland has only a negligible eect.
Looking at the middle panel clearly shows that Switzerland is a bit of an
5outsider. As it has a large GDP weight, it considerably aects the point esti-
mate. Omitting Switzerland increases ^ w and the estimate then lies well within
the plausible range. However, due to the dierent weights, the standard error
of this estimate is higher than before. Consequently, the condence interval is
wide and uninformative. Comparing the results with and without Korea shows
that its large weight has only a minor inuence on the results.
Finally, the results based on market capitalization convey more or less the
same message as those based on GDP. Korea's inuence is minimal, while
Switzerland seems to drive the outcomes to a rather large extent. Now the
uncertainty in the world coecient of risk aversion (not excluding Switzerland)
is even higher than in the middle panel, as can be inferred from the very wide
condence interval. In contrast, the result excluding Switzerland is more (yet
marginally) informative compared to the middle panel. This can be easily ex-
plained from the notion that the weight of Switzerland is larger in the bottom
panel.
Table 2: Pooled results
Notes: The world coecient of relative risk aversion is denoted by ^ w, the
standard error for the condence interval is the square root of equation (5) for
the top panel and the square root of equation (6) for the middle and bottom
panels. The critical value is taken from a t-distribution with k   1 degrees of
freedom. The top panel uses the optimal weights described by equation (4), the
middle and bottom panels use economic weights based on, respectively, GDP
and market capitalization at the end of 2003. In each panel, the top row holds
the outcomes using all countries, the second row disregards Korea while the
third row excludes Switzerland from the analysis.
Description ^ w 95 % CI
IV, A 4.569 -27.597 36.736
IV, KO 20.556 -32.760 73.871
IV, SW 4.570 -27.706 36.845
GDP, A -16.897 -712.005 678.211
GDP, KO -17.165 -729.899 695.569
GDP, SW -5.650 -240.947 229.646
MC, A -32.023 -1737.959 1673.913
MC, KO -32.359 -1765.127 1700.408
MC, SW -2.849 -202.368 196.669
6 Conclusion
The equity premium puzzle holds that the coecient of relative risk aversion
estimated from the consumption based CAPM with power utility is excessively
high. Moreover, estimates in the literature vary considerably. We employ
the jackknife resampling method in order to estimate the uncertainty asso-
6ciated with the coecient of relative risk aversion. Our results show that the
country-specic condence intervals are fairly wide. We never reject equality
to one. However, when the data of countries are pooled and a single, optimally
weighted point estimate is constructed, the resulting condence band is tighter
and presents less of a puzzle than the individual country estimates.
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